We consider the effect of giving incentives to ordinary citizens to report potential criminal activity. Additionally we look at the effect of 'profiling' and biased reporting. If police single out or profile a group for more investigation, then crime in the profiled group decreases. If a certain group is reported on more frequently through biased reporting by citizens, crime in the group reported on actually increases. In the second model, we consider a neighbourhood structure where individuals get information on possible criminal activity by neighbours on one side and decide whether to report or not based on the signal. When costs of reporting are low relative to the cost of being investigated, the costs of investigation increase in the number of reports and there is at least one biased individual. We show there is a "contagion equilibrium" where everyone reports his or her neighbour.
Introduction
In the last few years, the idea has once again surfaced that private citizens should be encouraged to report on "suspicious" activities in their neighbourhood, presumably because neighbours are in the best position to detect incipient criminal activity and are likely to be most severely affected by such activity. By neighbours, we mean not just people who are located nearby in space but anyone who can observe potential crime in a group more closely than law enforcement authorities. For example, potential whistle-blowers in corporations are able to observe signals indicating possible crimes among their co-workers. In fact, tax authorities encourage reporting from individuals about potential violators they might suspect. 1 Another feature of trying to direct resources to detect criminal activity has been in giving certain groups of people particular attention. As an example; it is often believed that blacks are subject to stop and searches more than whites in certain states in the US 2 . Studies in the U.K. and Canada also show prevalence of racial bias in stop and searches 3 . While racial profiling has been condemned by many people, there seems a fair amount of support for targetted policing. (See Harcourt (2006) , however, which discusses this and offers a detailed analysis against profiling).
Proposals to have neighbours informing on each other have naturally raised concerns about civil liberties and the right to privacy and the pros and cons of profiling are a matter of intense debate 4 . Our aim in this paper is to develop a formal model to examine the effectiveness of such neighbourhood surveillance and profiling.
There are two aspects of neighbourhood reporting, namely, the free rider problem (each neighbour would rather have another neighbour report) and the abil-1 As an example see http://www.endfraud.co.uk/Tax\%20Fraud.html which encourages U.K. residents to report tax fraud.
2 Whether this represents bias or simply arrest maximising behaviour is of course not entirely clear. Knowles, Persico, and Todd (2001) look at motor vehicle searches and find police behaviour 'consistent with the hypothesis of no racial prejudice against African-American motorists'. Lambert (see http://www.lamberthconsulting.com/about-racial-profiling/ research-articles.asp) however contends that there is profiling and one cannot, from the evidence available, support the the theory that stopping more blacks yields higher drug arrests per stop. 3 See http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/racial\_profiling/ for some discussion about prevalence of racial profiling in Canada. See also http://www.irr.org.uk/2004/july/ ak000006.html which discusses how racial profiling is considered an effective anti terror tool by many in the UK. 4 See for instance the New York Times January 4, 2010 : 'Will Profiling Make a Difference', link below http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/04/ will-profiling-make-a-difference/ ity of neighbours to direct police effort to specific investigation sites. The free rider problem is well understood (see for example Harrington (2001) ) so we shall deliberately set up the model so that there is no scope for free riding and focus on the second problem.
In the first model in this paper people are grouped (or profiled) in two categories, based on observable characteristics. Police observe reports about the individuals in the two groups and implement an optimal investigation strategy. There is a cost of investigating a site, which we assume differs across the two groups, and a cost of being investigated. If an investigation is made and a crime has indeed been committed, the criminal is apprehended and removed. If the criminal is apprehended, the criminal's neighbour gets positive payoffs in having the criminal removed from the neighbourhood. (Others outside the neighbourhood might get such benefits as well.)
We consider perfect Bayesian equilibrium crime rates, reporting and investigation strategies in this environment. We examine how an asymmetry in the cost of reporting as well as in reporting frequency of two otherwise symmetric groups leads to an endogenous asymmetry in crime rates in the two groups. In other words, even though both groups are ex ante identical in terms of their costs and benefits of committing crime, they end up with different crime rates in equilibrium. 5 We model differences by observable characteristics in two different ways. The first approach is to assume that a profiled group is given "priority for investigation" by the police and hence the cost of investigating a report on a member of such a group is lower. This leads to a higher probability of crime in the non-profiled group. More interestingly, we can also conceive of differences in the two groups as a lower ability by the potential reporter to distinguish suspicious from innocent activities when it emanates from a certain group. This leads to more reporting of a particular group and also a higher prior probability of crime in that group. This is particularly interesting because higher reporting in fact leads to higher crime in the group more reported on. This occurs as a result of police rationally taking into account the bias in reporting when investigating the group who face biased reporting. It turns out that this, in equilibrium, lowers the intensity of investigation that a criminal faces, to make it more profitable for that group to commit crime even after it accounts for the fact that it will be reported on and investigated more frequently.
Finally, we modify the model making use of an explicit neighbourhood structure, a simple one where a finite number of agents are placed around a circle. An individual can only observe the neighbour on her right (thus circumventing the 5 The crime rate is the ex ante probability that an agent will commit a crime. Since all sites are ex ante identical, this probability is the same for all sites in a symmetric equilibrium. Of course, if reports are informative, the probability that a crime has actually been committed, given reports, could differ across sites.
"free rider" problem) and report on that neighbour, given the signal she receives. The police force is divided into precincts and police in each precinct can ask for help from the precinct on their right as well. Costs of investigation are increasing in the number of reports. Costs of reporting are low and there exists one person who will always report her neighbour, if this neighbour is of a different type. This is commonly known, as is the existence of this person in fact being next to someone of a different group. In this environment there is an equilibrium where all N sites get reported on, through a kind of "contagion" effect. In fact, it turns out if costs of reporting are low in comparison to the cost of interrogation, there is no informative equilibrium.
The message we get is that the relation between crime and incentives from crime reporting is fairly complex and incentives for crime reporting may in fact lead to an increase in crime. Hence, the policy of encouraging increased vigilance about neighbours needs re-examination not just from the angle of intruding on the privacy of people but also in terms of its effectiveness in crime prevention.
Related literature
There is a large literature on crime starting from the seminal work by Becker (1968) who first analysed crime as an economic decision. Since then there have been several papers extending Becker's work and developing several aspects of crime and crime fighting policies. In particular, there are papers examining the relationship between law enforcement and crime rates. They include papers which have generated multiple equilibria as in Sah (1991) where similar economies could reach different equilibrium crime rates with a fixed level of resources devoted to law enforcement. The variation in these papers often arise from the channel through which multiplicity arises and most of them have a general equilibrium flavour. Examples include Fender (1999) , Burdett, Lagos, and Wright (2003) and Conley and Wang (2006) who also analyze deterrence policies. This variation has some empirical support as well. In particular, the issue of wide variation in crime rates has been addressed using a neighbourhood structure by Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (1996) . They work out the effect that neighbours have on behaviour; having criminal neighbours induces people to commit crime. Unlike their work, everyone in our model behaves completely rationally. In terms of the broad debate on public vs. private enforcement of law (see the classification and discussion in Polinsky and Shavell (2000) and references therein), our model falls somewhere in between. While enforcement is by a public law enforcement authority, the selection of the sites to investigate depends on neighbourhood reports.
There are of course papers which look at the effect of crime reporting (by victims) as in Goldberg and Nold (1980) , which does an empirical analysis, and Garoupa (2001) , who looks at a theoretical model where victims decide whether or not to report crime. Unlike in our model, encouraging reporting in his paper always reduces crime rates. Our paper is also related to the debate on statistical profiling (see for example Knowles, Persico, and Todd (2001) , Harcourt (2006) ). On a related issue, Eeckhout, Persico, and Todd (2005) study optimal policing with commitment and show that announcing random 'crackdowns' can be optimal. Even though their paper does not look at crime reporting, allowing the police to credibly announce that not all reports may be investigated with equal intensity (as they do) may lead to potentially interesting results in our framework. Our analysis is also in some sense complementary to the work of Harcourt (2006) , which points out how profiling can have perverse effects on crime rates. Verdier and Zenou (2004) also analyze how profiling can lead to a self fulfilling prophecy with equilibrium crime rates being higher in the profiled group. We discuss this further in the section on profiling and in the conclusion. In terms of modelling, mention may be made of some similarity that this paper has with auditing models (see for example Reinganum and Wilde (1986) ). There are, of course, many papers using a local observation approach in other fields (e.g. Ellison (1993) , Eshel, Samuelson, and Shaked (1998) , Chatterjee and Xu (2004) ), though the agents are not fully rational in most of these papers (an exception is Xue (2003) ). The last part of the paper uses a contagion argument as does, for example, Morris (2000) .
3 The model and notation
Agents and sites
There are a finite number N ≥ 3 of people 6 , each located at a single site on a circle. Agent i ∈ N learns the value x i ∈ {0, 1} 7 , where x i denotes person i s private benefit from crime. The probability that x i = 1 is given by a. To abstract from the free rider problem, we assume that each person has only one observant (or nosy) neighbour. Agent i after learning her value of x i decides whether to commit a crime or not which we denote by d i = 1 (commit a crime) or 0 (not commit a crime). The decision leads to an observable signal, s i for site i, which also takes 6 Typically, we think of N as large, though this is not used in any proofs. 7 The lower bound of the support might be negative rather than 0, in which case there will be some expected proportion of the population who would never commit a crime. While it is possible to incorporate such an assumption into the model, it would necessitate considering some special cases that we are able to ignore here which would detract from the main focus of our analysis. values of 0 or 1.We assume the following signal structure; if d i = 1, s i = 1 and if d i = 0, s i can be 1 with probability 1 − ξ and 0 with probability ξ . Thus, ξ represents the correct identification of non-suspicious behaviour and is therefore a measure of the accuracy of the signal. The accuracy is affected by possible errors or biases. After observing signals generated by her neighbour, an agent has to decide whether to report a site or not. To make things stark we have assumed that crime always generates a signal. What we need is simply the probability of crime, given the signal, to be higher than the probability given no signal. The agent incurs a cost of reporting η per report 8 and also, if she has been reported herself and is investigated, a cost of being investigated of γ. This cost of interrogation γ is independent of whether the person is a criminal or not. The reporting decision is denoted by ρ i ∈ [0, 1] where ρ i = (ρ i,i+1 ) denotes the reporting probabilities of i on i + 1. These will depend on whether d i = 1 or 0 9 and on the value of the signal s i+1 . We assume that Player i does not observe her own signal s i . Further, if a criminal is investigated she faces a penalty θ > 1. Thus, the decision to commit crime depends not just on the private benefit received but also on η, θ and γ as well as the expected reporting and investigation probabilities.
There is a social benefit of apprehending a crime at site i which we denote by K. The benefit to the neighbour on the left is assumed to be 1, where K ≥ 1. 10 The way we interpret this is as follows. Removing a criminal prevents future crime and hence benefits the neighbour and possibly others as well. Thus, there is a direct benefit of reporting. In considering whether to investigate a site the police do not consider the criminal's disutility from apprehension. This is unlike what is assumed in some of the economic literature on crime (see Kaplow and Shavell (2002) for discussion on this issue). 11 Figure 1 (overleaf) illustrates the direction of reporting in a neighbourhood with 6 people. 
The police
The police are modelled here as separate from the agents. This means that we rule out any nexus between the police and the community as well as any benefits that may accrue to the police from having crime reduced if the police also lived in the neighbourhood. This makes the model tractable and serves as a good approximation for communities where such interaction is minimal. An investigation strategy maps from the reports made about each site into an investigation probability of that site and is denoted by ω :
Note, we shall denote by ω i the investigation probability of site i. Let C(r) be the cost of investigating a site if reports have been received about r sites. We assume that C(r) is (weakly) increasing in r . This assumption is examined in Section 5. We now write down a timeline for the sequence of actions:
This is also illustrated in Figure 2 (overleaf) using a tree to give a flavour of the extensive form. The dotted arrows indicate that the reporting decision is made simultaneously by agents and the police make the investigation decision simultaneously following the reporting decisions.
Figure 2: Schematic for game with 2 players: C refers to chance, pol to police, i, i − 1 to sites.
Notation on probabilities. We have several different conditional probabilities and we now summarise the notation for these. Individual agents are usually denoted by i and the group, to which an agent belongs by j.
1. u i ( j)(1) = posterior probability of crime by i given a signal of 1 and observable group characteristic j. Its value is given by Lemma 2 below and is increasing in the accuracy of the signal. For example, if there were no error in the signal u i ( j)(1) = 1. 2. u i ( j) (0) = posterior probability of crime given a signal of 0 and observable group characteristic j. 3. λ i j = aα i j = prior probability of crime committed by agent i of group j.
u i
1 ( j) = posterior probability of crime committed by agent i of group j given a report. This depends on the reporting strategy. For example, if each agent decides to always report regardless of whether or not a signal is received then u i 1 ( j) is simply the prior probability of crime (since the report is not informative). However, in equilibrium u i 1 ( j) = u i ( j)(1) if ρ(0) = 0, so there are reports only if a signal of 1 is received. 5. u i 0 ( j) = posterior probability of crime given no report. This again depends on the reporting strategy.
We now derive the optimal behaviour for the police. This can be summarised by the following lemma. Assume for the moment that the observable characteristic j plays no role.
Lemma 1
The police investigation policy is as follows:
, where u i 1 is the conditional probability of crime in site i given the report. If
where u i 0 is the probability of crime in site i given no report .
Proof. This is clearly true, given the costs and benefits of investigation of a site, with K being the total benefit from apprehending and removing a criminal.
In the next section we analyse the issue of profiling and spell out the additional assumptions we make.
Payoffs
All payoffs are realized at the end of the game. The police payoffs are as given by the Lemma above. For each agent the payoffs depend on (i) the crime opportunity (ii) the decision to report and be reported on and (iii) the investigation probability. Moreover, the payoffs also depend on whether or not they have a criminal neighbour in which case an additional benefit of 1 is obtained if the criminal is removed. We give below some of the payoffs for agents (apart from the police).
Consider an agent in site i who receives x i = 1. If he commits crime his payoff is given by
if she does not have a criminal neighbour and an additional benefit of ρ i ω i+1 if her neighbour is a criminal (to capture the benefit of having the neighbour removed). If she does not commit crime her payoff is given by
if the neighbour is not a criminal with an additional ρ i ω i+1 as above, if the neighbour is a criminal. Thus, the agent chooses a strategy of whether to commit a crime or not depending on what gives her a greater payoff (possibly randomizing when indifferent).
Profiling and citizen bias
One of the more visible features of the policy of encouraging untrained individuals to report suspicious activities has been the importance these individuals give to observable characteristics, such as race, age or gender. In similar vein, police often pay more attention to this observable characteristic in deciding whether to chase up reports or not. 12 We consider these two types of bias separately. Initially, we suppose that the public is unbiased but the police preferentially investigates those with some particular observable characteristic. We then assume the police is unbiased, but the public receive signals which are 'biased' against one group. Recall that we assume that x i , s i ∈ {0, 1} for all sites i. Further, we suppose there is an observable characteristic A which can take on values A 0 and A 1 . We assume this observable characteristic does not affect the probability distribution of the random variable x. Denote P(x = 1 | A j ) = a j , j ∈ {0, 1}. We assume a 0 = a 1 = a, (i.e. the characteristic j is a priori uninformative). Further, the observable characteristic is randomly distributed. The only requirement we have is that there is at least one person with each characteristic.
Given the value of x i , agent i chooses d i ∈ [0, 1] . A signal s i is generated. Recall, if d i = 1, s i = 1. If d i = 0, s i = 0 with probability ξ j and s i = 1 with a probability 1 − ξ j , where j refers to the group characteristic. As mentioned, we assume that the signal generated by i is seen only by i −1. Let ω i j be the probability with which site i with characteristic j is investigated.
In order to model police profiling, we suppose the cost c 0 incurred in investigating any report about group A 0 is lower than the cost c 1 incurred in investigating a report about group A 1 . 13 The way we rationalise this assumption is to think of the police having incurred a fixed cost of investigating the profiled group (perhaps because that group has been more crime-prone in the past and so the police have already gathered some preliminary information on that group when making this fixed investment) so that the variable cost of investigating is lower.
We can calculate the posterior probabilities of crime from a member of group j, u i ( j)(0) or u i ( j)(1), given the priors and the value of the signal. Note that if s i = 0, u i ( j)(0) = 0, regardless of i or j. Denote by d i j (1) the decision by individual i in group j to commit crime if x i = 1 and by d i j (0) the corresponding decision if x i = 0. Denote by α i j the probability with which an agent at site i of group j will commit crime conditional on getting a benefit of 1. Then λ i j = aα i j , for site i belonging to group j, can be considered the prior probability of crime. Let ρ i j (1) denote the reporting decision conditional on a signal of 1 and ρ i j (0) reporting conditional on s i = 0. Since the reporting probabilities are assumed not to depend on group identity j, we henceforth suppress the j subscript on ρ i . The following calculation follows from Bayes' rule.
Proof. Follows from Bayes rule. We now characterise the (symmetric) Perfect Bayesian equilibrium in this set up. 14 We assume that all individuals of group j use the same strategy, so the notation now suppresses dependence on i.
,where u j = c j K . Then the behavioural strategy profile (d j (1), d j (0), ρ(1), ρ(0), ω j ) below constitutes a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the profiling game. The equilibrium is essentially unique given the beliefs off the equilibrium path.
(i). d j (1) is chosen so as to make u( j)(1) = u j , using the Bayes' Theorem calculations above. (ii). 1 γξ +θ = ρ(1)ω j , if both ρ and ω j are positive and −η + ω j u 1 ( j) ≥ 0. If the strict inequality holds, ρ(1) = 1. If the equality holds, ρ can be either 1 or in (0, 1), though the product ρ(1)ω j is determinate. If no report is observed, the equilibrium inference is Pr(d j (1) = 1) = u 0 ( j) < u j and ω j = 0. In equilibrium (see (iv) below), u 1 ( j) = u( j)(1). The formal proof is in the appendix. Here we provide an intuition for the result.
First, suppose that a <
.Then there will be no investigation even if α j = 1 because c j is too high so the cost of investigation outweighs the expected benefit. We therefore confine ourselves to non-trivial values of a. It is clear that a signal of 0 implies u( j)(0) = 0, so there will be no report. However, if a neighbour observes a signal of 1 generated by a site, he will report if the expected benefit is at least as great as the reporting cost. If the reporting cost is sufficiently small, as defined in (iii) above, a signal of 1 will always be reported. In this case, It is clear that α j will be chosen to set the probability that crime has been committed to u j , because if it is any higher, investigation will occur with probability 1 and therefore α j will be set to 0, in which case ω j should be 0. Therefore, only a randomised strategy will work in equilibrium. Therefore ω j must be chosen so as to make the criminal who derives benefit from crime at that site indifferent between committing and not committing the crime. If η is very high, no reporting will take place and once again α j will be set to make the probability of crime being discovered equal to u j . if η is in the intermediate range, ρ(1) is in (0, 1) and the value of ω j must be set to make the neighbour indifferent between reporting and not reporting. Now the reporting probability is determined by the indifference equation for the agent with x = 1, between committing and not committing a crime. The key aspect of this equilibrium is that A 0 is "profiled" as high priority for investigation and this makes c 1 > c 0 . Therefore u 1 (1) = u 1 , the posterior probability of crime, is higher for the non-priority group A 1 , from (i) in the proposition above. In the equilibrium in which ρ j ∈ (0, 1), the probability of investigation is lower and the reporting probability is higher (for the non-profiled group).
Note that in the previous discussion, we assume a constant unit cost of investigation for each type i.e. we do not investigate dependence of c 1 on the number of individuals of type A 0 reported. As mentioned earlier, if we drop this assumption and make costs increase with the number of reports, it gives an additional incentive for type A 1 to report on type A 0 neighbours because it lowers the probability of being investigated.
The effect on welfare of removing the cost difference between investigating different groups is indeterminate and depends on the proportion of each type and what each type does in equilibrium. This is consistent with what Eeckhout et al. (2005) find in their model of an optimal crackdown. Harcourt (2006) considers different elasticities among groups and shows how profiling can actually increase overall crime. It would be interesting to look at what such differences in responsiveness lead to, in terms of overall crime rates, in our framework. We now show that even without such differences crime rates in profiled groups could go up depending on how we think of profiling.
A second way to think of giving a group special attention is to allow for more reports to occur about that group. This could happen as a result of receiving "incorrect" signals about a group more frequently. 15 The parameter in the model of this section that corresponds best with the informal stories of individuals of a particular type being treated with suspicion is ξ . A lower ξ means that even when someone in the group (say group 0) has not committed a crime "false signals" are generated, possibly due to bias of the observer. Consequently, we get the following result using the analysis in the proposition above but making c j = c and admitting different values of ξ j for the two groups.
Proposition 2 If the "false signal" generated about group 0 is greater than that for group 1, i.e. 1 − ξ 0 > 1 − ξ 1 , c j = c and the other assumptions about the values of η, γ, θ ,K,a all continue to hold, the following must be true (i) ρ 0 ω 0 > ρ 1 ω 1 , (i.e. the investigation probability of group 0 conditional on generating a signal is greater than for group 1)unless ρ j = 0 for both j, (ii) α 0 > α 1 . i.e. conditional on getting a crime opportunity group 0 is more likely to commit crime Proof. Part (i) follows from the proof of the previous proposition. Recall that 1 − ξ is the probability that a signal of 1 is generated even though d i j = 0. That gives us (suppressing the subscripts and for a positive ρ) ρω = 1 θ +γξ which is decreasing in ξ (and hence increasing in 1-ξ ). The posterior probability of crime is given by c k so is independent of ξ . Part (ii) follows from the fact that the posterior probability of a crime given a report will remain at c K in equilibrium. In expression (3), the left-hand side is independent of j, by the fact that u 0 = u 1 in equilibrium. The denominator on the RHS is higher for j = 0. Therefore, the numerator must also be higher to maintain u 0 = u 1 and since a j = a, the quantity α 0 must be greater than α 1 , Remark 1 Note that in this case, the posterior probability of crime given a report is the same for both groups. However, the probability that a crime is committed is higher for the group facing observer bias. The intuition behind this result is not just that more errors in reporting cause more crime because fear of discovery is lower. Here the error actually causes more reporting and investigation in equilibrium, not less. Reporting and investigation would find less crime on average because of the error (unless α 0 were greater than α 1 ) and this would lead to the benefit of investigation to be less than the cost and hence not optimal to perform unless 'compensated' by a higher prior probability of crime.
Note, the long run effects of such bias could be even more perverse if we consider how this may lead to a higher crime rate as a result of (for example) employment discrimination as analyzed by Verdier and Zenou (2004) .
We end this section with a simple numerical example to illustrate our results Crime rates in the two groups conditional on getting a signal are of course the same. The group which generates false signals more gets reported on more frequently (with a ρ of 0.61 vs. 0.58 for the other group). In equilibrium, the probabilities of committing crime conditional in getting an opportunity are different with the corresponding values α 1 = .18 and α 0 = 0.33 and thus λ j = aα j = prior probability of crime committed by group j differs with group 0 (the group being reported on more frequently) having a higher prior probability of crime given by (0.5) (0.33)=0.166 while for group 1 it is (0.5)(0.18)=0.09.
5 The model with a neighbourhood structure and low reporting costs
The previous section has focused on the effect of bias of two kinds on the incidence of crime in the group being targeted or not targeted. We now combine the models with biased reporting with a neighbourhood structure and assume that the cost of reporting is 'small' (in a sense to be made more precise in the results). We also introduce a cost of investigation that depends on the number of reports that the police face. We now consider each of these in turn.
(i) Biased reporting. Suppose that there exists one person of type A 1 next to a type A 0 right neighbour for whom reporting a neighbour of type A 0 is optimal for both s i = 0 and for s i = 1. Call this a type A individual. All other combinations take optimal decisions given the inference structure with Prob (s i = 0 | d i = 0)= ξ as before.
(ii) The neighbourhood structure. To recall from the model section, players i, i = 1, 2..N are arranged in a circle and numbered clockwise; the signal generated by i is observed by i − 1 but not by i + 1. Player i gets a benefit of 1 if the player i + 1 is removed, if d i+1 = 1. Each player observes the appropriate neighbour's signal but not the neighbour's actual decision.
(iii) The police investigation decision takes place in two stages. The sites on the circle are divided into "precincts". A precinct comprises of two sites with one assigned police officer in each precinct. A precinct consisting of sites {i, i + 1} can cooperate with a precinct {i + 2, i + 3}. 16 There are two possible values of the costs of investigation, c 1 and c 2 , the first if a precinct is not at capacity and the second if it is. By being at capacity, we mean that the police in that precinct has the maximum number of reports it can investigate while spare capacity means that it is capable of investigating more reports. This captures the fact that costs of investigation are increasing in the number of reports. 17 After all the reports are in, neighbouring precincts with spare capacity "raise their hands". If help is sought and there exists a neighbouring precinct with spare capacity, then the cost of investigating each site is c 1 again and c 2 if there is no spare capacity. To illustrate, suppose there are 4 people in the game; call them 1, 2, 3 and 4. We assume that 1 and 2 are a precinct and 3 and 4 are another. Police in precinct 1 (say) are at capacity if they have to investigate reports about both 1 and 2 while that are "spare" if they have 0 or 1 report in which case they can co operate their neighbouring precinct. Thus, if both 3 and 4 have to be investigated (and the first precinct has spare capacity) co operation with the precincts will reduce the overall cost of investigation in that precinct from c 2 to c 1 .
We recall that the benefit from investigating a site is u i 1 ( j)K, where u i 1 ( j) is 16 A general formulation with n persons per precinct and cooperation with both left and right precincts would make the analysis more complete, especially in avoiding the asymmetric nature of co-operation among precincts in this model (help is available only with the neighbouring precinct on the right). However, such an analysis, though possible, would not add any more essential qualitative insights.
17 It is possible to provide microfoundations for this using diminishing returns of police labour supply, which we do in an earlier version of this paper the posterior probability of a crime having been committed by site i of type j, given a report, and K is the benefit to society of having a criminal discovered. As before, the cost of being investigated is γ and if an individual has committed a crime, the penalty is θ if the crime is discovered.
The timeline is the same as before, with one additional "raising hands" stage before the investigation is carried out.
Equilibrium
We investigate perfect Bayes equilibria in pure reporting strategies.
θ and Ka ≥ c 2 , there exists an equilibrium, in pure reporting strategies, in which ρ i−1,i = the probability of i−1 reporting i, is 1, independent of the signal. If a player does not report (off the equilibrium path), beliefs are assumed not to change.
The condition on the prior probability a is similar to the one in the previous propositions to rule out trivial pure strategy equilibria. From Proposition 1 we know that the investigation probability in this case will be 1 θ . What we need to show is that no person can gain by deviating i.e. switching from reporting to not reporting. Suppose, there is a deviation by someone who does not receive a signal i.e. she now switches from reporting to not reporting if the signal is 0. Then the deviation is not profitable if the disutility from the increase in probability of investigation to 1 18 from 1 θ is greater than the cost of reporting η i.e.
which is the condition in the proposition. It is easy to show (see Appendix) that in this case deviation to not reporting for a signal of 1 is not profitable. Also if the reporter has herself committed the crime, γ is replaced everywhere by (γ + θ ), for which the condition holds automatically if it holds for γ. It is easy to see that the values of γ, θ and η in Example 1 in the previous section satisfies this inequality. Notice that this proposition essentially requires conditions on the reporting cost η being small in comparison to the interrogation cost γ (
This result does not require the assumption of biased reporting but the cost structure of the police is used along with the result of optimal investigation (in Lemma 1) to derive the condition for this proposition.
The next question we ask is whether there is an informative equilibrium, one in which s i = 1 gets reported and s i = 0 does not. 19 Proposition 4 There cannot exist an informative equilibrium if the reporting cost η is sufficiently low in the sense detailed in the proof below and the location of the special "always report" person is (as assumed before) known to his neighbours after the signals and before reporting.
Remark 2 Note this is the only result for which the assumption is used of the existence of a player for whom it is a dominant strategy to report his neighbour of another type.
Essentially, what we prove is that an informative equilibrium does not exist for low enough cost of reporting so that a signal s i = 1 gets reported and a signal s i = 0 does not. To do this, we need to look at various cost intervals the crime rate can fall into. First, we use the assumption that the neighbour of the biased individual knows she will get reported. By reporting her neighbour she incurs a cost of reporting but gains in an expected lowered probability of investigation (for example from certain investigation to investigation with a probability less than 1 or from a positive probability to 0 probability of investigation). Next, we use the cost structure of the police investigation and compare it to the benefits. If the benefit from the decreased probability of investigation is higher than the cost of reporting she will always report her neighbour. If that is the case, a person who lives next to her will expect to be reported on and in turn she may report her neighbour to similarly lower her probability of investigation. Thus, the chain spreads and everyone reports his or her neighbour. Clearly, this will be true if γ is relatively high compared to η as well as the cost of investigation by the police. The proof requires us to consider all possible values that the posterior crime rate can take and the conditions for each cost interval which need to be satisfied. The basic intuition however is essentially the same-people report to lower their probability of being investigated by the police.
It is worth remarking that the contagion effect is not an artifact of the rational investigation strategy followed by the police. Indeed, we have proved elsewhere (see Bandyopadhyay and Chatterjee (2006) ) that even when police choose a fixed investigation strategy, the contagion result holds. The key elements for the result to hold are that reporting costs should be low, cost of interrogation should be high and more reports can decrease intensity of investigation. In the current paper, note we need only one extremely biased person and the opportunity for that person to exhibit his bias, along with low reporting costs, for informative equilibria to disappear.
Conclusion and extensions
We have presented a game-theoretic model of crime and crime reporting to examine the possible effects of profiling and lowering the costs of reporting suspicious activities (signals of crime). We find that what is meant by profiling needs to be clarified to understand its effects. If a group is marked by the police so that it is investigated more intensely following reports, crime in the group so profiled goes down. However, if citizens harbour a certain bias about a group and therefore report the group more frequently crime in the group being reported on more often actually goes up. It is interesting to note that if the police are also biased this may not hold-thus an increase in distortions may actually lower crime. Further, we show that when reporting costs are low and interrogation costs are high (a not unnatural scenario) reports can be completely uninformative in equilibrium. It is also worth remarking that in a model where people can choose neighbourhoods the presence of type A 1 people next to type A 0 may cause neighbours to move away, leading to segregated neighbourhoods. All this suggests that, while there may be some merit in having citizens direct the police about where to look for possible criminal activity, its effects may turn out to be the opposite of what was intended. Thus, a more careful evaluation of the pros and cons of citizen reporting needs to be undertaken.
Several extensions arise naturally from this work. An issue we have mentioned in section 2 is to look at optimal 'crackdown' a la Eeckhout et al. (2005) in our framework to see how well it deters crime (if at all). Another issue we have touched on, but which needs more investigation, is the general equilibrium effect associated with trying to lower crime of any one type leading to increases in other types of crime (the so called 'displacement effect'). This is implicitly captured in our optimal investigation model in terms of the increased cost of having to chase more reports, which can be interpreted as the opportunity cost of having less to spend on other types of crimes, but a fuller formalisation of this is left for future work. We also do not tackle the related and interesting issue of whether a neighbourhood watch programme can bring down crime by increasing the accuracy of reports. This is of course of particular interest, as a problem with the kind of reporting that is generally encouraged pays no heed to developing a standard of what could constitute a suspicious activity. Presumably in a successful neighbourhood watch programme the police will invest in training citizens in being able to infer what are suspicious activities. This would be formally equivalent to increasing the accuracy of the signal. Hence, it would be interesting to see what kind of equilibria emerge in such an environment. Another interesting question is whether clustering or dispersion of criminals across sites can lead to different crime rates by leading to different actual number of sites reported. Hence, even for an identical distribution of x i , whether the high x i are in neighbouring sites or far away can matter for the actual number of criminals in any period. A dynamic extension can thus look at the long run path of crime starting from a particular realization of x i , which should yield interesting results. In fact, if initial shocks lead to different crime rates the effects of profiling may well perpetuate these differences (see Harcourt (2006) for an in-depth discussion of this issue and Verdier and Zenou (2004) , which looks at how initial beliefs could lead to a self fulfilling prophecy). These, along with a more thorough investigation of empirical evidence, remain for future research.
that it is optimal to report s i = 1, we consider i − 1 s reporting problem. Reporting is at least as good as not reporting for the non-criminal if
which holds if the preceding inequality holds. Also if i − 1 has himself committed the crime, γ is replaced everywhere by (γ + θ ), for which the condition holds automatically if it holds for γ.
The next question we ask is whether there is an informative equilibrium, one in which s i = 1 gets reported and s i = 0 does not. 20 Proof of Proposition 4 Suppose to the contrary there is an informative equilibrium, so that a signal s i = 1 gets reported and a signal s i = 0 does not. We again break up the proof into several steps. Proof. (i) Given the assumption that Ka > c 2 , it must be the case that, if x i = 1, player i randomises between crime and no crime, so α i ∈ (0, 1). This is because α i = 1 is not an equilibrium choice, given that it leads to certain investigation and α i = 0 is not one because it leads to no investigation. Therefore, Player i must be indifferent between d i = 1 and d i = 0, and therefore ω = 1 θ +γξ , where ω is the overall equilibrium probability of investigation. 21 (ii) Consider the one type A agent for whom reporting a neighbour of type 0 is optimal for s i = 1 or 0, and let this agent be at site i − 1.Let agent i be of type 0, who observes s i+1 = 0. Let q = (aα + (1 − aα)(1 − ξ )), the probability that any site other than i generates a signal of 1 and is therefore reported on in this candidate equilibrium. With u i 1 ( j) being the posterior probability of crime, given a signal, Ku i 1 ( j) is the benefit from investigating for the police. We need to consider the various cost intervals in which u can fall. Suppose first that Ku i 1 ( j) ∈ (c 1 , c 2 ). Then i knows he will be reported on by i − 1 and investigated with probability 1 if he does not report. If he does report, he will be investigated with probability 1-q 2
(1) i.e. will be investigated except when two sites other than i generate a signal of 1.Here q (1) refers to the value of q if α is determined by this particular value of u i.e. Ku i1 ( j) ∈ (c 1 , c 2 ). The gain from reporting will then be (q 2
(1) )γ = ρ 1 , say. Therefore, if η < ρ 1 , i will report i + 1 even if he observes a signal of 0. Here the value of α is determined from the equation that the ex ante probability of being 20 It is easy to see there is an uniformative equilibrium where no one reports. This is sustained by the rather unpalatable off the path equilibrium belief that the police investigates the person who has reported with probability 1 (see Bandyopadhyay and Chatterjee (2006) for a characterization). 21 As each person faces an independent draw of x, s one needs to compute probabilities across various cost realisations i.e. one needs to compute probabilties of the cost being c 1 or c 2 which would determine probability of investigation. investigated must be ω, if this equation has a solution. If it does not, we go to the next case, where a solution will exist.
(iii) Suppose that Ku i1 ( j) = c j , where c j ∈ {c 1 , c 2 }. Then the police is indifferent between investigating and not for some fixed number of reports and investigates with probability ω when that number is realised (to make the total probability ω. If c j = c 1 , the probability of being investigated drops from ω to 0 with probability q 2 (2) , so the condition is now η < q 2 (2) ωγ = ρ 2 , with q now being determined by the indifference equation Ku = c 1 .
If Ku i1 ( j) = c 2 , not reporting will mean a probability 1 of being investigated. Reporting will reduce the probability to ω with probability q 2 (3) . Let ρ 3 = q 2 (3) (1-ω)γ. Let ρ * =min {ρ 1 , ρ 2 , ρ 3 }. Then for η < ρ * , i will report i + 1.
(iv) By our assumptions, it is common knowledge that there is one type A 1 person who will report a type A 0 person and is next to a type A 0 person, and this location is revealed to his neighbours after the signals have been generated but before reporting. Therefore i knows he will be reported on by i − 1, and will therefore (if the condition holds) report i + 1, and the contagion will spread so that everyone reports irrespective of the signal.
